In subsection (d), the word “contumacy” is omitted as included in “refuses or fails”. The words “may bring an action to enforce the order” are substituted for “upon the application by” for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code. The words “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” in section 5 of the Act of June 30, 1936 (which were substituted for “the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia” by section 32(b) of the Act of June 25, 1948 (ch. 646, 62 Stat. 991), as amended by section 127 of the Act of May 24, 1949 (ch. 139, 63 Stat. 107), and which were editorially omitted from 41:39) are omitted as included in “a district court of the United States” because of sections 88 and 132(a) of title 28, United States Code. The words “within the court’s judicial district”’ are substituted for “within the jurisdiction of which” for clarity and for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code. The words “requiring the person to obey the order issued under subsection (c)” are substituted for “requiring such person to appear before him or representative designated by him, to produce evidence if, as, and when so ordered, and to give testimony relating to the matter under investigation or in question” for clarity and to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsection (e), the duty to make findings of fact is restated as a duty of the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative). The grammatical structure of the last sentence of 41:39 seems to suggest that the court, rather than the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative), serves as fact finder. However, the provision taken as a whole indicates that it is the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative) who serves as fact finder. It is the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative) before whom hearings are held, witnesses testify, and evidence is produced. The court’s involvement is limited to compelling recalcitrant witnesses “to appear before him [the Secretary] or representative designated by him”. The restatement clarifies the generally accepted understanding that the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative) serves as fact finder (see, e.g., United States v. Sweet Briar, 92 F. Supp. 777, 780 (W.D.S.C. 1950) (“the Secretary ‘shall make findings of fact’ ”); Ready-Mix Concrete Company v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 571, 578 (Cl. Ct. 1958) (“the findings of the Department of Labor”)).