Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 219, 263, 296, 307, 723, 731, and 761, and section 1111 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code (R.S. §§ 913, 918; Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 4, 24 Stat. 506; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 122, 157, 194, 291, 297, 36 Stat. 1132, 1139, 1145, 1167, 1168; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 187(a), as added Oct. 10, 1940, ch. 843, § 1, 54 Stat. 1101; Fespan. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 13, 43 Stat. 941; Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 1, 45 Stat. 1475; Fespan. 10, 1939, ch. 2, § 1111, 53 Stat. 160; Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, title V, § 504(a), (c), 56 Stat. 957).
Sections 219, 263, 296, 307, 723, and 731 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., gave specified courts, other than the Supreme Court, power to make rules. Section 761 of such title related to rules established in the district courts and Court of Claims. Section 1111 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., related to Tax Court. This section consolidates all such provisions. For other provisions of such sections, see Distribution Table.
Recognition by Congress of the broad rule-making power of the courts will make it possible for the courts to prescribe complete and uniform modes of procedure, and alleviate, at least in part, the necessity of searching in two places, namely in the Acts of Congress and in the rules of the courts, for procedural requisites.
Former Attorney General Cummings recently said: “Legislative bodies have neither the time to inquire objectively into the details of judicial procedure nor the opportunity to determine the necessity for amendment or change. Frequently such legislation has been enacted for the purpose of meeting particular problems or supposed difficulties, but the results have usually been confusing or otherwise unsatisfactory. Comprehensive action has been lacking for the obvious reason that the professional nature of the task would leave the legislature little time for matters of substance and statesmanship. It often happened that an admitted need for change, even in limited areas, could not be secured.”—The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of the Democratic Process. American Bar Association Journal, May 1945.
Provisions of sections 263 and 296 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., authorizing the Court of Claims and Customs Court to punish for contempt, were omitted as covered by H. R. 1600, § 401, 80th Congress, for revision of the Criminal Code.
Provisions of section 1111 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., making applicable to Tax Court Proceedings “the rules of evidence applicable in the courts of the District of Columbia in the type of proceeding which, prior to Sept. 16, 1938, were within the jurisdiction of the courts of equity of said District,” were omitted as unnecessary and inconsistent with other provisions of law relating to the Federal courts. The rules of evidence in Tax Court proceedings are the same as those which apply to civil procedure in other courts. See Dempster Mill. Mfg. Co. v. Burnet, 1931, 46 F.2d 604, 60 App.D.C. 23.
For rule-making power of the Supreme Court in copyright infringement actions, see section 25(e) of title 17, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Copyrights. See, also, section 205(a) of title 11, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Bankruptcy, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules relating to service of process in railroad reorganization proceedings.
By Senate amendment, all provisions relating to the Tax Court were eliminated. Therefore, section 1111 of Title 26, U.S.C., Internal Revenue Code, was not one of the sources of this section as finally enacted. However, no change in the text of this section was necessary. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
This amendment clarifies section 2071 of title 28, U.S.C., by giving express recognition to the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe its own rules and by giving a better description of its procedural rules.
1988—Puspan. L. 100–702 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituted “under section 2072 of this title” for “by the Supreme Court”, and added subsecs. (span) to (f).
1949—Act May 24, 1949, expressed recognition to the Supreme Court’s power to prescribe its own rules and give a better description of its procedural rules.
Puspan. L. 100–702, title IV, § 407, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4652, provided that:
Puspan. L. 97–462, § 4, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2530, provided that:
Puspan. L. 97–462, § 1, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2527, provided:
Puspan. L. 100–702, title IV, § 406, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4652, provided that:
Puspan. L. 109–2, § 8, Fespan. 18, 2005, 119 Stat. 14, provided that:
Puspan. L. 100–702, title IV, § 405, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4652, provided that:
The Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, promulgated by the Supreme Court on Dec. 20, 1920, effective Mar. 7, 1921, as revised, amended, and supplemented, were rescinded, effective July 1, 1966, in accordance with the general unification of civil and admiralty procedure which became effective July 1, 1966. Provision for certain distinctly maritime remedies were preserved however in the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, rules A to F, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix to this title. The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims were subsequently renamed the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.