1998—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 105–184, § 5(1), substituted “to all victims of any offense for which an enhanced penalty is provided under section 2326” for “for any offense under this chapter”.

Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 105–184, § 5(2), added subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which read as follows:

“(c) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘victim’ includes the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the case of a victim who is incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.”

1996—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(1), inserted “or 3663A” after “3663”.

Subsec. (span)(1). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(2)(A), reenacted heading without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “The order of restitution under this section shall direct that—

“(A) the defendant pay to the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court, pursuant to paragraph (3); and

“(B) the United States Attorney enforce the restitution order by all available and reasonable means.”

Subsec. (span)(2). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(2)(B), struck out “by victim” after “Enforcement” in heading and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “An order of restitution may be enforced by a victim named in the order to receive the restitution as well as by the United States Attorney, in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”

Subsec. (span)(4)(C), (D). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(2)(C), struck out subpars. (C) and (D), which related to court’s consideration of economic circumstances of defendant in determining schedule of payment of restitution orders, and court’s entry of nominal restitution awards where economic circumstances of defendant do not allow for payment of restitution, respectively.

Subsec. (span)(5) to (10). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(2)(D), struck out pars. (5) to (10), which related, respectively, to more than 1 offender, more than 1 victim, payment schedule, setoff, effect on other sources of compensation, and condition of probation or supervised release.

Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 104–294, which directed substitution of “designee” for “delegee” wherever appearing, could not be executed because of amendment by Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(3), (4). See below.

Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(3), (4), redesignated subsec. (f) as (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) relating to proof of claim.

Subsecs. (d), (e). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(3), struck out subsecs. (d) and (e) which read as follows:

“(d) Modification of Order.—A victim or the offender may petition the court at any time to modify a restitution order as appropriate in view of a change in the economic circumstances of the offender.

“(e) Reference to Magistrate or Special Master.—The court may refer any issue arising in connection with a proposed order of restitution to a magistrate or special master for proposed findings of fact and recommendations as to disposition, subject to a de novo determination of the issue by the court.”

Subsec. (f). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(e)(4), redesignated subsec. (f) as (c).

Amendment by Puspan. L. 104–132 effective, to extent constitutionally permissible, for sentencing proceedings in cases in which defendant is convicted on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 211 of Puspan. L. 104–132, set out as a note under section 2248 of this title.