18 USC 2259 - Mandatory restitution

Editorial Notes

References in Text

The date of enactment of this subsection, referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(D)(i), is the date of enactment of Puspan. L. 115–299, which was approved Dec. 7, 2018.

Amendments

2018—Subsec. (span)(1). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 3(a)(1), substituted “Except as provided in paragraph (2), the order” for “The order” and struck out “as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2)” after “of the victim’s losses”.

Subsec. (span)(2). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 3(a)(4), added par. (2). Former par. (2) redesignated (3).

Subsec. (span)(3). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 3(a)(2), (3), redesignated par. (2) as (3) and struck out former par. (3) which defined “full amount of the victim’s losses”.

Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 3(span)(1), (2), (5), substituted “Definitions” for “Definition” in subsec. heading, designated existing provisions as par. (4) and inserted par. heading, and added pars. (1) to (3).

Subsec. (c)(4). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 3(span)(3), (4), substituted “under this chapter. In the case” for “under this chapter, including, in the case”, and inserted “may assume the crime victim’s rights under this section,” after “or any other person appointed as suitable by the court,”.

Subsec. (d). Puspan. L. 115–299, § 4, added subsec. (d).

1996—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(1), inserted “or 3663A” after “3663”.

Subsec. (span)(1). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(2)(A), reenacted heading without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “The order of restitution under this section shall direct that—

“(A) the defendant pay to the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court, pursuant to paragraph (3); and

“(B) the United States Attorney enforce the restitution order by all available and reasonable means.”

Subsec. (span)(2). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(2)(B), struck out “by victim” after “Enforcement” in heading and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “An order of restitution may also be enforced by a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”

Subsec. (span)(4)(C), (D). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(2)(C), struck out subpars. (C) and (D), which related to court’s consideration of economic circumstances of defendant in determining schedule of payment of restitution orders, and court’s entry of nominal restitution awards where economic circumstances of defendant do not allow for payment of restitution, respectively.

Subsec. (span)(5) to (10). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(2)(D), struck out pars. (5) to (10), which related, respectively, to more than 1 offender, more than 1 victim, payment schedule, setoff, effect on other sources of compensation, and condition of probation or supervised release.

Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(3), (4), redesignated subsec. (f) as (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) relating to proof of claim.

Subsecs. (d), (e). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(3), struck out subsecs. (d) and (e) which read as follows:

“(d) Modification of Order.—A victim or the offender may petition the court at any time to modify a restitution order as appropriate in view of a change in the economic circumstances of the offender.

“(e) Reference to Magistrate or Special Master.—The court may refer any issue arising in connection with a proposed order of restitution to a magistrate or special master for proposed findings of fact and recommendations as to disposition, subject to a de novo determination of the issue by the court.”

Subsec. (f). Puspan. L. 104–132, § 205(c)(4), redesignated subsec. (f) as (c).

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Effective Date of 1996 Amendment

Amendment by Puspan. L. 104–132 effective, to extent constitutionally permissible, for sentencing proceedings in cases in which defendant is convicted on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 211 of Puspan. L. 104–132, set out as a note under section 2248 of this title.

Findings

Puspan. L. 115–299, § 2, Dec. 7, 2018, 132 Stat. 4383, provided that: “Congress finds the following:

“(1) The demand for child pornography harms children because it drives production, which involves severe child sexual abuse and exploitation.

“(2) The harms caused by child pornography begin, but do not end, with child sex assault because child pornography is a permanent record of that abuse and trafficking in those images compounds the harm to the child.

“(3) In Paroline v. United States (2014), the Supreme Court recognized that ‘every viewing of child pornography is a repetition of the victim’s abuse’.

“(4) The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children has stated that for victims of child pornography, ‘the sexual abuse of the child, the memorialization of that abuse which becomes child pornography, and its subsequent distribution and viewing become psychologically intertwined and each compound the harm suffered by the child-victim’.

“(5) Victims suffer continuing and grievous harm as a result of knowing that a large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of their childhood sexual abuse. Harms of this sort are a major reason that child pornography is outlawed.

“(6) The unlawful collective conduct of every individual who reproduces, distributes, or possesses the images of a victim’s childhood sexual abuse plays a part in sustaining and aggravating the harms to that individual victim.

“(7) It is the intent of Congress that victims of child pornography be compensated for the harms resulting from every perpetrator who contributes to their anguish. Such an aggregate causation standard reflects the nature of child pornography and the unique ways that it actually harms victims.”