Section 541(a)(7) is new. The provision clarifies that any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case is property of the estate; for example, if the estate enters into a contract, after the commencement of the case, such a contract would be property of the estate. The addition of this provision by the House amendment merely clarifies that section 541(a) is an all-embracing definition which includes charges on property, such as liens held by the debtor on property of a third party, or beneficial rights and interests that the debtor may have in property of another. However, only the debtor’s interest in such property becomes property of the estate. If the debtor holds bare legal title or holds property in trust for another, only those rights which the debtor would have otherwise had emanating from such interest pass to the estate under section 541. Neither this section nor section 545 will affect various statutory provisions that give a creditor a lien that is valid both inside and outside bankruptcy against a bona fide purchaser of property from the debtor, or that creates a trust fund for the benefit of creditors meeting similar criteria. See Packers and Stockyards Act § 206, 7 U.S.C. 196 (1976).
Section 541(c)(2) follows the position taken in the House bill and rejects the position taken in the Senate amendment with respect to income limitations on a spend-thrift trust.
Section 541(d) of the House amendment is derived from section 541(e) of the Senate amendment and reiterates the general principle that where the debtor holds bare legal title without any equitable interest, that the estate acquires bare legal title without any equitable interest in the property. The purpose of section 541(d) as applied to the secondary mortgage market is identical to the purpose of section 541(e) of the Senate amendment and section 541(d) will accomplish the same result as would have been accomplished by section 541(e). Even if a mortgage seller retains for purposes of servicing legal title to mortgages or interests in mortgages sold in the secondary mortgage market, the trustee would be required by section 541(d) to turn over the mortgages or interests in mortgages to the purchaser of those mortgages.
The seller of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market will often retain the original mortgage notes and related documents and the seller will not endorse the notes to reflect the sale to the purchaser. Similarly, the purchaser will often not record the purchaser’s ownership of the mortgages or interests in mortgages under State recording statutes. These facts are irrelevant and the seller’s retention of the mortgage documents and the purchaser’s decision not to record do not change the trustee’s obligation to turn the mortgages or interests in mortgages over to the purchaser. The application of section 541(d) to secondary mortgage market transactions will not be affected by the terms of the servicing agreement between the mortgage servicer and the purchaser of the mortgages. Under section 541(d), the trustee is required to recognize the purchaser’s title to the mortgages or interests in mortgages and to turn this property over to the purchaser. It makes no difference whether the servicer and the purchaser characterize their relationship as one of trust, agency, or independent contractor.
The purpose of section 541(d) as applied to the secondary mortgage market is therefore to make certain that secondary mortgage market sales as they are currently structured are not subject to challenge by bankruptcy trustees and that purchasers of mortgages will be able to obtain the mortgages or interests in mortgages which they have purchased from trustees without the trustees asserting that a sale of mortgages is a loan from the purchaser to the seller.
Thus, as section 541(a)(1) clearly states, the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. To the extent such an interest is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of the estate except to the extent that defenses which are personal against the debtor are not effective against the estate.
Property of the estate: The Senate amendment provided that property of the estate does not include amounts held by the debtor as trustee and any taxes withheld or collected from others before the commencement of the case. The House amendment removes these two provisions. As to property held by the debtor as a trustee, the House amendment provides that property of the estate will include whatever interest the debtor held in the property at the commencement of the case. Thus, where the debtor held only legal title to the property and the beneficial interest in that property belongs to another, such as exists in the case of property held in trust, the property of the estate includes the legal title, but not the beneficial interest in the property.
As to withheld taxes, the House amendment deletes the rule in the Senate bill as unnecessary since property of the estate does not include the beneficial interest in property held by the debtor as a trustee. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (section 7501) [26 U.S.C. 7501], the amounts of withheld taxes are held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. Where the Internal Revenue Service can demonstrate that the amounts of taxes withheld are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case, then if a trust is created, those amounts are not property of the estate. Compare In re Shakesteers Coffee Shops, 546 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1976) with In re Glynn Wholesale Building Materials, Inc. (S.D. Ga. 1978) and In re Progress Tech Colleges, Inc., 42 Aftr 2d 78–5573 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
Where it is not possible for the Internal Revenue Service to demonstrate that the amounts of taxes withheld are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case, present law generally includes amounts of withheld taxes as property of the estate. See, e.g., United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1973) [91 S. Ct. 991, 28 L.Ed.2d 273] and In re Tamasha Town and Country Cluspan, 483 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1973). Nonetheless, a serious problem exists where “trust fund taxes” withheld from others are held to be property of the estate where the withheld amounts are commingled with other assets of the debtor. The courts should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which the Internal Revenue Service, and other tax authorities, can demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case. For example, where the debtor had commingled that amount of withheld taxes in his general checking account, it might be reasonable to assume that any remaining amounts in that account on the commencement of the case are the withheld taxes. In addition, Congress may consider future amendments to the Internal Revenue Code [title 26] making clear that amounts of withheld taxes are held by the debtor in a trust relationship and, consequently, that such amounts are not property of the estate.
This section defines property of the estate, and specifies what property becomes property of the estate. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate. Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property, wherever located, as of the commencement of the case. The scope of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6) [section 110(a)(6) of former title 11]), and all other forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act § 70a [section 110(a) of former title 11], as well as property recovered by the trustee under section 542 of proposed title 11, if the property recovered was merely out of the possession of the debtor, yet remained “property of the debtor.” The debtor’s interest in property also includes “title” to property, which is an interest, just as are a possessory interest, or lease-hold interest, for example. The result of Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), is followed, and the right to a refund is property of the estate.
Though this paragraph will include choses in action and claims by the debtor against others, it is not intended to expand the debtor’s rights against others more than they exist at the commencement of the case. For example, if the debtor has a claim that is barred at the time of the commencement of the case by the statute of limitations, then the trustee would not be able to pursue that claim, because he too would be barred. He could take no greater rights than the debtor himself had. But see proposed 11 U.S.C. 108, which would permit the trustee a tolling of the statute of limitations if it had not run before the date of the filing of the petition.
Paragraph (1) has the effect of overruling Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), because it includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under proposed 11 U.S.C. 522, and the court will have jurisdiction to determine what property may be exempted and what remains as property of the estate. The broad jurisdictional grant in proposed 28 U.S.C. 1334 would have the effect of overruling Lockwood independently of the change made by this provision.
Paragraph (1) also has the effect of overruling Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
Situations occasionally arise where property ostensibly belonging to the debtor will actually not be property of the debtor, but will be held in trust for another. For example, if the debtor has incurred medical bills that were covered by insurance, and the insurance company had sent the payment of the bills to the debtor before the debtor had paid the bill for which the payment was reimbursement, the payment would actually be held in a constructive trust for the person to whom the bill was owed. This section and proposed 11 U.S.C. 545 also will not affect various statutory provisions that give a creditor of the debtor a lien that is valid outside as well as inside bankruptcy, or that creates a trust fund for the benefit of a creditor of the debtor. See Packers and Stockyards Act § 206, 7 U.S.C. 196.
Bankruptcy Act § 8 [section 26 of former title 11] has been deleted as unnecessary. Once the estate is created, no interests in property of the estate remain in the debtor. Consequently, if the debtor dies during the case, only property exempted from property of the estate or acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case and not included as property of the estate will be available to the representative of the debtor’s probate estate. The bankruptcy proceeding will continue in rem with respect to property of the state, and the discharge will apply in personam to relieve the debtor, and thus his probate representative, of liability for dischargeable debts.
The estate also includes the interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community property, subject to certain limitations; property that the trustee recovers under the avoiding powers; property that the debtor acquires by bequest, devise, inheritance, a property settlement agreement with the debtor’s spouse, or as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy within 180 days after the petition; and proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earning from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case. Proceeds here is not used in a confining sense, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, but is intended to be a broad term to encompass all proceeds of property of the estate. The conversion in form of property of the estate does not change its character as property of the estate.
Subsection (span) excludes from property of the estate any power, such as a power of appointment, that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor. This changes present law which excludes powers solely benefiting other persons but not other entities.
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the debtor, in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property of the estate. The provisions invalidated are those that restrict or condition transfer of the debtor’s interest, and those that are conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a bankruptcy case, or on the appointment of a custodian of the debtor’s property. Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust that the restriction is enforceable nonbankruptcy law to the extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his dependents.
Subsection (d) [enacted as (e)], derived from section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act [section 110(c) of former title 11], gives the estate the benefit of all defenses available to the debtor as against an entity other than the estate, including such defenses as statutes of limitations, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses, and makes waiver by the debtor after the commencement of the case ineffective to bind the estate.
Section 541(e) [enacted as (d)] confirms the current status under the Bankruptcy Act [former title 11] of bona fide secondary mortgage market transactions as the purchase and sale of assets. Mortgages or interests in mortgages sold in the secondary market should not be considered as part of the debtor’s estate. To permit the efficient servicing of mortgages or interests in mortgages the seller often retains the original mortgage notes and related documents, and the purchaser records under State recording statutes the purchaser’s ownership of the mortgages or interests in mortgages purchased. Section 541(e) makes clear that the seller’s retention of the mortgage documents and the purchaser’s decision not to record do not impair the asset sale character of secondary mortgage market transactions. The committee notes that in secondary mortgage market transactions the parties may characterize their relationship as one of trust, agency, or independent contractor. The characterization adopted by the parties should not affect the statutes in bankruptcy on bona fide secondary mortgage market purchases and sales.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (span)(3), is Puspan. L. 89–329, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1219, which is classified generally to chapter 28 (§ 1001 et seq.) of Title 20, Education. Part C of title IV of the Act was formerly classified to part C (§ 2751 et seq.) of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to transfer to part C (§ 1087–51 et seq.) of subchapter IV of chapter 28 of Title 20. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of Title 20 and Tables.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsecs. (span)(5) to (7), (10) and (f), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (span)(7)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)(I), is Puspan. L. 93–406, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 829. Title I of the Act is classified generally to subchapter I (§ 1001 et seq.) of chapter 18 of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of Title 29 and Tables.
2020—Subsec. (span)(11). Puspan. L. 116–260, § 1001(a)(2), struck out par. (11) which read as follows: “recovery rebates made under section 6428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”
Puspan. L. 116–260, § 1001(a)(1), added par. (11).
2014—Subsec. (span)(10). Puspan. L. 113–295 added par. (10).
2010—Subsec. (span)(6)(B). Puspan. L. 111–327 substituted “section 529(span)(6)” for “section 529(span)(7)”.
2005—Subsec. (span)(4). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 225(a)(1)(A), struck out “or” at end.
Subsec. (span)(4)(B)(ii). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 1212, inserted “365 or” before “542”.
Subsec. (span)(5), (6). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 225(a)(1)(C), added pars. (5) and (6). Former par. (5) redesignated (9).
Subsec. (span)(7). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 323, added par. (7).
Subsec. (span)(8). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 1230, added par. (8).
Subsec. (span)(9). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 225(a)(1)(B), redesignated par. (5) as (9).
Subsec. (e). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 225(a)(2), added subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 1221(c), added subsec. (f).
1994—Subsec. (span)(4). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 208(span), designated existing provisions of subpar. (A) as cl. (i) of subpar. (A), redesignated subpar. (B) as cl. (ii) of subpar. (A), substituted “the interest referred to in clause (i)” for “such interest”, substituted “; or” for period at end of cl. (ii), and added subpar. (B).
Puspan. L. 103–394, § 223(2), which directed the amendment of subsec. (span)(4) by striking out period at end and inserting “; or”, was executed by inserting “or” after semicolon at end of subsec. (span)(4)(B)(ii), as added by Puspan. L. 103–394, § 208(span)(3), to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsec. (span)(5). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 223, added par. (5).
1992—Subsec. (span). Puspan. L. 102–486 added par. (4) and closing provisions.
1990—Subsec. (span)(3). Puspan. L. 101–508 added par. (3).
1984—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(a)(1), (2), struck out “under” after “under” and inserted “and by whomever held” after “located”.
Subsec. (a)(3). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(a)(3), inserted “329(span), 363(n),”.
Subsec. (a)(5). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(a)(4), substituted “Any” for “An”.
Subsec. (a)(6). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(a)(5), substituted “or profits” for “and profits”.
Subsec. (span). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 363(a), amended subsec. (span) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (span) read as follows: “Property of the estate does not include any power that the debtor may only exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor.”
Subsec. (c)(1). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(span)(1), inserted “in an agreement, transfer, instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law”.
Subsec. (c)(1)(B). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(span)(2), substituted “taking” for “the taking”, and inserted “before such commencement” after “custodian”.
Subsec. (d). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(c), inserted “(1) or (2)” after “(a)”.
Subsec. (e). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 456(d), struck out subsec. (e) which read as follows: “The estate shall have the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against an entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses. A waiver of any such defense by the debtor after the commencement of the case does not bind the estate.”
Puspan. L. 116–260, div. FF, title X, § 1001(a)(2), Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 3216, provided that the amendment made by section 1001(a)(2) is effective on the date that is 1 year after Dec. 27, 2020.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 113–295 applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title on or after Dec. 19, 2014, see section 104(d) of Puspan. L. 113–295, set out as a note under section 521 of this title.
Amendment by section 1221(c) of Puspan. L. 109–8 applicable to cases pending under this title on Apr. 20, 2005, or filed under this title on or after Apr. 20, 2005, with certain exceptions, see section 1221(d) of Puspan. L. 109–8, set out as a note under section 363 of this title.
Amendment by sections 225(a), 323, 1212, and 1230 of Puspan. L. 109–8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Puspan. L. 109–8, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 103–394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Puspan. L. 103–394, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 102–486 effective Oct. 24, 1992, but not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before Oct. 24, 1992, see section 3017(c) of Puspan. L. 102–486, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 98–353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Puspan. L. 98–353, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
The dollar amounts specified in this section were adjusted by notices of the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to section 104 of this title as follows:
By notice dated Jan. 31, 2022, 87 F.R. 6625, effective Apr. 1, 2022, in subsec. (span), dollar amount “6,825” was adjusted to “7,575” each time it appeared. See notice of the Judicial Conference of the United States set out as a note under section 104 of this title.
By notice dated Fespan. 5, 2019, 84 F.R. 3488, effective Apr. 1, 2019, in subsec. (span)(5)(C), (6)(C), (10)(C), dollar amount “6,425” was adjusted to “6,825”.
By notice dated Fespan. 16, 2016, 81 F.R. 8748, effective Apr. 1, 2016, in subsec. (span)(5)(C), (6)(C), dollar amount “6,225” was adjusted to “6,425”.
By notice dated Fespan. 12, 2013, 78 F.R. 12089, effective Apr. 1, 2013, in subsec. (span)(5)(C), (6)(C), dollar amount “5,850” was adjusted to “6,225”.
By notice dated Fespan. 19, 2010, 75 F.R. 8747, effective Apr. 1, 2010, in subsec. (span)(5)(C), (6)(C), dollar amount “5,475” was adjusted to “5,850”.
By notice dated Fespan. 7, 2007, 72 F.R. 7082, effective Apr. 1, 2007, in subsec. (span)(5)(C), (6)(C), dollar amount “5,000” was adjusted to “5,475”.