1. U.S. Code
  2. title 42
  3. chapter 23
  4. subchapter X
  5. § 2153f

Collapse to view only § 2153f. Savings clause; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

§ 2151. Effect of international arrangements

Any provision of this chapter or any action of the Commission to the extent and during the time that it conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangements made after August 30, 1954 shall be deemed to be of no force or effect.

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 121, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 939; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2151

§ 2152. Policies contained in international arrangements

In the performance of its functions under this chapter, the Commission shall give maximum effect to the policies contained in any international arrangement made after August 30, 1954.

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 122, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 939; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2152

§ 2153. Cooperation with other nations
No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or regional defense organization pursuant to sections 2073, 2074(a), 2077, 2094, 2112, 2121, 2133, 2134, or 2164 of this title shall be undertaken until—
(a) Terms, conditions, duration, nature, scope, and other requirements of proposed agreements for cooperation; Presidential exemptions; negotiations; Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
the proposed agreement for cooperation has been submitted to the President, which proposed agreement shall include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the cooperation; and shall include the following requirements:
(1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason;
(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere;
(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose;
(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c) of this title and agreements for cooperation with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;
(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and, except in the case of agreements arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, any production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement, will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of the United States;
(6) a guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement;
(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or other nuclear materials which have been ir­radiated) otherwise altered in form or span without the prior approval of the United States;
(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States; and
(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this subsection.
The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title) from any of the requirements of the foregoing sentence if he determines that inclusion of any such requirement would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and after consultation with the Commission shall be submitted to the President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy accompanied by the views and recommendations of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Secretary of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the consistency of the text of the proposed agreement for cooperation with all the requirements of this chapter, with specific attention to whether the proposed agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. Each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared pursuant to this chapter shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title, any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(d) of this title which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, by the Secretary of Defense;
(b) Presidential approval and authorization for execution of proposed agreements for cooperation
(c) Submittal of proposed agreements for cooperation to Congressional committees
(d) Congressional action
Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation (except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d) of this title) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those committees, promptly furnish to those committees their views as to whether the safeguards and other controls contained therein provide an adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.
If, after March 10, 1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement for cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set forth in subsection (a)(2), such failure to act shall constitute a failure to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to section 2157(b)(3) of this title for purposes of the Commission’s consideration of applications and requests under section 2155(a)(2) of this title and there shall be no congressional review pursuant to section 2157 of this title of any subsequent license or authorization with respect to that state until the first such license or authorization which is issued after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in which the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the Congress.
(e) Congressional committees informed of initiatives or negotiations relating to cooperation agreements
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 123, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 940; amended Pub. L. 85–479, §§ 3, 4, July 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 277; Pub. L. 85–681, § 4, Aug. 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 632; Pub. L. 88–489, § 15, Aug. 26, 1964, 78 Stat. 606; Pub. L. 93–377, § 5, Aug. 17, 1974, 88 Stat. 475; Pub. L. 93–485, § 1, Oct. 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 1460; Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 401, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 142; Pub. L. 99–64, title III, § 301(a), (b), July 12, 1985, 99 Stat. 159, 160; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; Pub. L. 103–337, div. C, title XXXI, § 3155(c)(1), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 3092; Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(5), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592; Pub. L. 104–106, div. A, title XV, § 1505(g), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 515; Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, title XII, § 1225(d)(4), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–774; Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 104(e), Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2734; Pub. L. 110–369, title II, § 202, Oct. 8, 2008, 122 Stat. 4033.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153

§ 2153a. Approval for enrichment after export of source or special nuclear material; export of major critical components of enrichment facilities
(a) Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation, no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the United States for such enrichment: Provided, That the procedures governing such approvals shall be identical to those set forth for the approval of proposed subsequent arrangements under section 2160 of this title, and any commitments from the recipient which the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State deem necessary to ensure that such approval will be obtained prior to such enrichment shall be obtained prior to the submission of the executive branch judgment regarding the export in question and shall be set forth in such submission: And provided further, That no source or special nuclear material shall be exported for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of nations which has, after March 10, 1978, entered into a new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States, except pursuant to such agreement.
(b) In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement for cooperation (except an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title) unless such agreement for cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes of this subsection, the term “major critical component” means any component part or group of component parts which the President determines to be essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility.
(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 402, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 145.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153a

§ 2153b. Export policies relating to peaceful nuclear activities and international nuclear trade
The President shall take immediate and vigorous steps to seek agreement from all nations and groups of nations to commit themselves to adhere to the following export policies with respect to their peaceful nuclear activities and their participation in international nuclear trade:
(a) Undertakings by transferee nations receiving nuclear material and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology
No nuclear materials and equipment and no sensitive nuclear technology within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the nation or group of nations receiving such transfer commits itself to strict undertakings including, but not limited to, provisions sufficient to ensure that—
(1) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclear-weapon state, shall be used for nuclear explosive devices for any purpose or for research on or development of nuclear explosive devices for any purpose, except as permitted by Article V, the Treaty;
(2) IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclear-weapon state;
(3) adequate physical security measures will be established and maintained by any nation or group of nations on all of its nuclear activities;
(4) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any nation or group of nations shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations which does not agree to stringent undertakings meeting the objectives of this section; and
(5) no nation or group of nations will assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device.
(b) Enrichment of source or special nuclear material only under effective international auspices and inspection
(1) No source or special nuclear material within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be enriched (as described in section 2014(aa)(2) of this title) or reprocessed, no irradiated fuel elements containing such material which are to be removed from a reactor will be altered in form or span, and no fabrication or stockpiling involving plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235 shall be performed except in a facility under effective international auspices and inspection, and any such irradiated fuel elements shall be transferred to such a facility as soon as practicable after removal from a reactor consistent with safety requirements. Such facilities shall be limited in number to the greatest extent feasible and shall be carefully sited and managed so as to minimize the proliferation and environmental risks associated with such facilities. In addition, there shall be conditions to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon states other than the host country to sensitive nuclear technology associated with such facilities.
(2) Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the necessary short-term storage of fuel elements containing plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (1) shall be placed under effective international auspices and inspection.
(c) Establishment of physical security measures
(d) United States military activities
(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 403, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 146.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153b

§ 2153c. Renegotiation of agreements for cooperation
(a) Application to existing agreements of undertakings required of new agreements after March 10, 1978
(b) Presidential review of export agreement conditions and policy goals
(c) Presidential proposals for additional export criteria
(d) Congressional action
(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 404, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 147; Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(g), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4593.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153c

§ 2153d. Authority to continue agreements for cooperation entered into prior to March 10, 1978
(a) The amendments to section 2153 of this title made by this Act shall not affect the authority to continue cooperation pursuant to agreements for cooperation entered into prior to March 10, 1978.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority to include dispute settlement provisions, including arbitration, in any agreement made pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation.
(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 405, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 148.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153d

§ 2153e. Protection of environment

The President shall endeavor to provide in any agreement entered into pursuant to section 2153 of this title for cooperation between the parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities.

(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 407, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 148.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153e

§ 2153e–1. Effectiveness of rule, regulation, or procedure with regard to exports subject to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

No environmental rule, regulation, or procedure shall become effective with regard to exports subject to the provisions of 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq., the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, until such time as the President has reported to Congress on the progress achieved pursuant to section 407 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2153e) entitled “Protection of the Environment” which requires the President to seek to provide, in agreements required under the Act, for cooperation between the parties in protecting the environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contaminations arising from peaceful nuclear activities.

(Pub. L. 95–630, title XIX, § 1913, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3727.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153e-1

§ 2153f. Savings clause; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
(a) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, contracts, agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges—
(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective in the exercise of functions which are the subject of this Act, by (i) any agency or officer, or part thereof, in exercising the functions which are affected by this Act, or (ii) any court of competent jurisdiction, and
(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect,
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or repealed as the case may be, by the parties thereto or by any court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the procedures or requirements applicable to agreements for cooperation entered into pursuant to sections 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title or arrangements pursuant thereto as it was in effect immediately prior to March 10, 1978.
(Pub. L. 95–242, title VI, § 603(a), (b), Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 152.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2153f

§ 2154. International atomic pool

The President is authorized to enter into an international arrangement with a group of nations providing for international cooperation in the nonmilitary applications of atomic energy and he may thereafter cooperate with that group of nations pursuant to sections 2074(a), 2077, 2094, 2112, 2133, 2134, or 2164(a) of this title: Provided, however, That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 2153 of this title.

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 124, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 940; amended Pub. L. 93–377, § 5, Aug. 17, 1974, 88 Stat. 475; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2154

§ 2155. Export licensing procedures
(a) Executive branch judgment on export applications; criteria governing United States nuclear exportsNo license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”) for the export of any production or utilization facility, or any source material or special nuclear material, including distributions of any material by the Department of Energy under section 2074, 2094, or 2112 of this title, for which a license is required or requested, and no exemption from any requirement for such an export license may be granted by the Commission, as the case may be, until—
(1) the Commission has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is the judgment of the executive branch that the proposed export or exemption will not be inimical to the common defense and security, or that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. The Secretary of State shall, within ninety days after March 10, 1978, establish orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for the preparation of the executive branch judgment on export applications under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such applications, express deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the processing of such applications, predetermined procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of inter-agency administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending applications, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency’s needs at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial applications should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic consultations con 1
1 So in original. Probably should be “can”.
be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary showings, for the decisions required under this section. The processing of any export application proposed and filed as of March 10, 1978, shall not be delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to implement the requirements of this section. The executive branch judgment shall be completed in not more than sixty days from receipt of the application or request, unless the Secretary of State in his discretion specifically authorizes additional time for consideration of the application or request because it is in the national interest to allow such additional time. The Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of any such authorization. In submitting any such judgment, the Secretary of State shall specifically address the extent to which the export criteria then in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party has adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. In the event he considers it warranted, the Secretary may also address the following additional factors, among others:
(A) whether issuing the license or granting the exemption will materially advance the non-proliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient nation to adhere to the Treaty, or to participate in the undertakings contemplated by section 2153b or 2153c(a) of this title;
(B) whether failure to issue the license or grant the exemption would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States; and
(C) whether the recipient nation or group of nations has agreed that conditions substantially identical to the export criteria set forth in section 2156 of this title will be applied by another nuclear supplier nation or group of nations to the proposed United States export, and whether in the Secretary’s judgment those conditions will be implemented in a manner acceptable to the United States.
The Secretary of State shall provide appropriate data and recommendations, subject to requests for additional data and recommendations, as required by the Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as the case may be; and
(2) the Commission finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the criteria in section 2156 of this title or their equivalent, and any other applicable statutory requirements, are met: Provided, That continued cooperation under an agreement for cooperation as authorized in accordance with section 2154 of this title shall not be prevented by failure to meet the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of section 2156 of this title for a period of thirty days after March 10, 1978, and for a period of twenty-three months thereafter if the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that the nation or group of nations bound by the relevant agreement has agreed to negotiations as called for in section 2153c(a) of this title; however, nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under agreements for cooperation in force on March 10, 1978: Provided further, That if, upon the expiration of such twenty-four month period, the President determines that failure to continue cooperation with any group of nations which has been exempted pursuant to the above proviso from the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of section 2156 of this title, but which has not yet agreed to comply with those provisions would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, he may, after notifying the Congress of his determination, extend by Executive order the duration of the above proviso for a period of twelve months, and may further extend the duration of such proviso by one year increments annually thereafter if he again makes such determination and so notifies the Congress. In the event that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate reports a joint resolution to take any action with respect to any such extension, such joint resolution will be considered in the House or Senate, as the case may be, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 2159 of this title: And additionally provided, That the Commission is authorized to (A) make a single finding under this subsection for more than a single application or request, where the applications or requests involve exports to the same country, in the same general time frame, of similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes and under reasonably similar circumstances and (B) make a finding under this subsection that there is no material changed circumstance associated with a new application or request from those existing at the time of the last application or request for an export to the same country, where the prior application or request was approved by the Commission using all applicable procedures of this section, and such finding of no material changed circumstance shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of this paragraph for findings of the Commission. The decision not to make any such finding in lieu of the findings which would otherwise be required to be made under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review: And provided further, That nothing contained in this section is intended to require the Commission independently to conduct or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting country or site specific visitations in the Commission’s consideration of the application of IAEA safeguards.
(b) Requests to be given timely consideration; Presidential review if Commission is unable to make required statutory determinations; Commission review
(1) Timely consideration shall be given by the Commission to requests for export licenses and exemptions and such requests shall be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory requirements have been met.
(2) If, after receiving the executive branch judgment that the issuance of a proposed export license will not be inimical to the common defense and security, the Commission does not issue the proposed license on a timely basis because it is unable to make the statutory determinations required under this chapter, the Commission shall publicly issue its decision to that effect, and shall submit the license application to the President. The Commission’s decision shall include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting or separate views. If, after receiving the proposed license application and reviewing the Commission’s decision, the President determines that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the proposed export may be authorized by Executive order: Provided, That prior to any such export, the President shall submit the Executive order, together with his explanation of why, in light of the Commission’s decision, the export should nonetheless be made, to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title) and shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such proposed export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed export. Any such Executive order shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions: And provided further, That the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) of section 2155a of this title shall provide that the Commission shall immediately initiate review of any application for a license under this section and to the maximum extent feasible shall expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive branch review, while awaiting the final executive branch judgment. In initiating its review, the Commission may identify a set of concerns and requests for information associated with the projected issuance of such license and shall transmit such concerns and requests to the executive branch which shall address such concerns and requests in its written communications with the Commission. Such procedures shall also provide that if the Commission has not completed action on the application within sixty days after the receipt of an executive branch judgment that the proposed export or exemption is not inimical to the common defense and security or that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes, the Commission shall inform the applicant in writing of the reason for delay and provide follow-up reports as appropriate. If the Commission has not completed action by the end of an additional sixty days (a total of one hundred and twenty days from receipt of the executive branch judgment), the President may authorize the proposed export by Executive order, upon a finding that further delay would be excessive and upon making the findings required for such Presidential authorizations under this subsection, and subject to the Congressional review procedures set forth herein. However, if the Commission has commenced procedures for public participation regarding the proposed export under regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (b) of section 2155a of this title, or—within sixty days after receipt of the executive branch judgment on the proposed export—the Commission has identified and transmitted to the executive branch a set of additional concerns or requests for information, the President may not authorize the proposed export until sixty days after public proceedings are completed or sixty days after a full executive branch response to the Commission’s additional concerns or requests has been made consistent with subsection (a)(1) of this section: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall affect the right of the Commission to obtain data and recommendations from the Secretary of State at any time as provided in subsection (a)(1) of this section.
(c) Additional export criteria
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 126, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 304(a), Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 131; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; amended Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(5), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592; Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, title XII, § 1225(d)(5), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–774.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2155

§ 2155a. Regulations establishing Commission procedures covering grant, suspension, revocation, or amendment of nuclear export licenses or exemptions
(a) Omitted
(b) Within one hundred and twenty days of March 10, 1978, the Commission shall, after consultations with the Secretary of State, promulgate regulations establishing procedures (1) for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any nuclear export license or exemption pursuant to its statutory authority; (2) for public participation in nuclear export licensing proceedings when the Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest and will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations required by the 1954 Act, including such public hearings and access to information as the Commission deems appropriate: Provided, That judicial review as to any such finding shall be limited to the determination of whether such finding was arbitrary and capricious; (3) for a public written Commission opinion accompanied by the dissenting or separate views of any Commissioner, in those proceedings where one or more Commissioners have dissenting or separate views on the issuance of an export license; and (4) for public notice of Commission proceedings and decisions, and for recording of minutes and votes of the Commission: Provided further, That until the regulations required by this subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the Commission.
(c) The procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing proceedings before the Commission and, notwithstanding section 189 a. of the 1954 Act [42 U.S.C. 2239(a)], shall not require the Commission to grant any person an on-the-record hearing in such a proceeding.
(Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 304(b), (c), Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 135.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2155a

§ 2155b. International nuclear export and innovation activities
(a) Commission coordination
(1) In generalThe Commission shall—
(A) coordinate all work of the Commission relating to—
(i) import and export licensing for nuclear reactors and radioactive materials; and
(ii) international regulatory cooperation and assistance relating to nuclear reactors and radioactive materials, including with countries that are members of—(I) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; or(II) the Nuclear Energy Agency; and
(B) support interagency and international coordination with respect to—
(i) the consideration of international technical standards to establish the licensing and regulatory basis to assist the design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors and use of radioactive materials;
(ii) efforts to help build competent nuclear regulatory organizations and legal frameworks in foreign countries that are seeking to develop civil nuclear industries; and
(iii) exchange programs and training provided, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to foreign countries relating to civil nuclear licensing and oversight to improve the regulation of nuclear reactors and radioactive materials, in accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) Exchange programs and trainingWith respect to the exchange programs and training described in paragraph (1)(B)(iii), the Commission shall coordinate, as applicable, with—
(A) the Secretary of Energy;
(B) the Secretary of State;
(C) the National Laboratories;
(D) the private sector; and
(E) institutions of higher education.
(b) Authority to establish branch
(c) Omitted
(d) Interagency coordination
(e) Savings clause
(Pub. L. 118–67, div. B, title I, § 101, July 9, 2024, 138 Stat. 1450.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2155b

§ 2156. Criteria governing United States nuclear exports
The United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
(1) IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.
(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof. Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 2156a of this title, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations.
(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.
(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or span, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.
(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 127, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 305, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 136; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2156

§ 2156a. Regulations establishing levels of physical security to protect facilities and material

Within sixty days of March 10, 1978, the Commission shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Defense, promulgate (and may from time to time amend) regulations establishing the levels of physical security which in its judgement are no less strict than those established by any international guidelines to which the United States subscribes and which in its judgment will provide adequate protection for facilities and material referred to in paragraph (3) of section 2156 of this title taking into consideration variations in risks to security as appropriate.

(Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 304(d), Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 135; Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, title XII, § 1225(e)(3), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–775.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2156a

§ 2157. Additional export criterion and procedures
(a)
(1) As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export.
(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.
(b) The criterion set forth in subsection (a) shall be applied as an export criterion with respect to any application for the export of materials, facilities, or technology specified in subsection (a) which is filed after eighteen months from March 10, 1978, or for any such application under which the first export would occur at least twenty-four months after March 10, 1978, except as provided in the following paragraphs:
(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to approve an export to which this subsection applies because such criterion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or authorization may be issued subject to other applicable requirements of the law: Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization facility or of any source or special nuclear material (intended for use as fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been licensed or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to any non-nuclear-weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion until the first such license or authorization with respect to such state is submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of the reasons underlying the President’s determination, the judgment of the executive branch required under section 2155 of this title, and any Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title) and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions.
(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology specified in subsection (a) shall be permitted for the remainder of that Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or the President notifies the Congress that he has determined that significant progress has been made in achieving adherence to such criterion by such state or that United States foreign policy interests dictate reconsideration and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of paragraph (1), does not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it disagrees with the President’s determination.
(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval with respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the criterion set forth in subsection (a) shall not be applied as an export criterion with respect to exports of materials, facilities and technology specified in subsection (a) to that state: Provided, That the first license or authorization with respect to that state which is issued pursuant to this paragraph after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period specified in paragraph (1), and the first such license or authorization which is issued after each twelve-month period thereafter, shall be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to the procedures specified in paragraph (1): Provided further, That if the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval during any review period provided for by this paragraph, the provisions of paragraph (2) shall apply with respect to further exports to such state.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 128, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 306, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 137; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; amended Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(5), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2157

§ 2158. Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports
(a) No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported to—
(1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to have, at any time after March 10, 1978,
(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or
(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or
(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or
(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities; or
(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to have, at any time after March 10, 1978,
(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied or the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto pursuant to section 2153a(a) of this title; or
(B) assisted, encouraged, or induced any non-nuclear-weapon state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or inducement; or
(C) entered into an agreement after March 10, 1978, for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection with an international fuel cycle evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which the United States subscribes;
unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided, That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the President’s determination, together with a report containing the reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title), but any such determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions.
(b)
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including specifically section 2151 of this title, and except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology, including items and assistance authorized by section 2077(b) of this title and regulated under part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, and nuclear-related items on the Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, shall be exported or reexported, or transferred or retransferred whether directly or indirectly, and no Federal agency shall issue any license, approval, or authorization for the export or reexport, or transfer, or retransfer, whether directly or indirectly, of these items or assistance (as defined in this paragraph) to any country whose government has been identified by the Secretary of State as engaged in state sponsorship of terrorist activities (specifically including any country the government of which has been determined by the Secretary of State under section 2371(a) of title 22, section 4605(j)(1) 1
1 See References in Text note below.
of title 50, or section 2780(d) of title 22 to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism).
(2) This subsection shall not apply to exports, reexports, transfers, or retransfers of radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, cameras, tamper-indication devices, nuclear detectors, monitoring systems, or equipment necessary to safely store, transport, or remove hazardous materials, whether such items, services, or information are regulated by the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, or the Commission, except to the extent that such technologies, equipment, seals, cameras, devices, detectors, or systems are available for use in the design or construction of nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.
(3) The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) to a country if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the waiver will not result in any increased risk that the country receiving the waiver will acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, or any materials or components of nuclear weapons and—
(A) the government of such country has not within the preceding 12-month period willfully aided or abetted the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully aided and abetted an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded nuclear materials;
(B) in the judgment of the President, the government of such country has provided adequate, verifiable assurances that it will cease its support for acts of international terrorism;
(C) the waiver of that paragraph is in the vital national security interest of the United States; or
(D) such a waiver is essential to prevent or respond to a serious radiological hazard in the country receiving the waiver that may or does threaten public health and safety.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 129, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 307, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 138; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; amended Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(5), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592; Pub. L. 109–58, title VI, § 632(a), Aug. 8, 2005, 119 Stat. 788; Pub. L. 110–369, title II, § 203, Oct. 8, 2008, 122 Stat. 4033.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2158

§ 2159. Congressional review procedures
(a) Committee consideration of Presidential submissions; reports
(b) Consideration of resolution by respective Houses of Congress
(c) Debate
(d) Vote on final approval
(e) Appeals from decisions of Chair
(f) Resolution
(g) Continuity of Congressional sessions; computation of time
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), for the purposes of this section—
(A) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die; and
(B) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session.
(2) For purposes of this section insofar as it applies to section 2153 of this title—
(A) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die at the end of a Congress; and
(B) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session.
(h) Supersedure or change in rulesThis section is enacted by Congress—
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of resolutions described by subsection (f) of this section; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(i) Joint resolutions
(1) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “joint resolution” means—
(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 2153 of this title, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress (does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on _____ .”,
(B) for a determination under section 2158 of this title, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress does not favor the determination transmitted to the Congress by the President on _____ .”, or
(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.”,
with the date of the transmission of the proposed agreement for cooperation inserted in the blank, and the affirmative or negative phrase within the parenthetical appropriately selected.
(2) On the day on which a proposed agreement for cooperation is submitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate under section 2153(d) of this title, a joint resolution with respect to such agreement for cooperation shall be introduced (by request) in the House by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for himself and the ranking minority member of the Committee, or by Members of the House designated by the chairman and ranking minority member; and shall be introduced (by request) in the Senate by the majority leader of the Senate, for himself and the minority leader of the Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate. If either House is not in session on the day on which such an agreement for cooperation is submitted, the joint resolution shall be introduced in that House, as provided in the preceding sentence, on the first day thereafter on which that House is in session.
(3) All joint resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the appropriate committee or committees, and all joint resolutions introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title, the Committee on Armed Services.
(4) If the committee of either House to which a joint resolution has been referred has not reported it at the end of 45 days after its introduction (or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15 days after its introduction), the committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution or of any other joint resolution introduced with respect to the same matter; except that, in the case of a joint resolution which has been referred to more than one committee, if before the end of that 45-day period (or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period) one such committee has reported the joint resolution, any other committee to which the joint resolution was referred shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution or of any other joint resolution introduced with respect to the same matter.
(5) A joint resolution under this subsection shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. For the purpose of expediting the consideration and passage of joint resolutions reported or discharged pursuant to the provisions of this subsection, it shall be in order for the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to present for consideration a resolution of the House of Representatives providing procedures for the immediate consideration of a joint resolution under this subsection which may be similar, if applicable, to the procedures set forth in section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
(6) In the case of a joint resolution described in paragraph (1), if prior to the passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House, that House receives a joint resolution with respect to the same matter from the other House, then—
(A) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but
(B) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 130, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 308, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 139; amended Pub. L. 99–64, title III, § 301(c), July 12, 1985, 99 Stat. 160; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(5), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592; Pub. L. 110–369, title II, § 205, Oct. 8, 2008, 122 Stat. 4033.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2159

§ 2160. Subsequent arrangements
(a) Consultation and concurrence; negotiations of a policy nature; notice of proposed subsequent arrangements; Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement; reprocessing of material
(1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and shall consult with the Commission, and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the written determination of the Secretary of Energy that such arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and such proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen days after publication. Whenever the Secretary of State is required to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent arrangement which is the subject of the requirement to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement shall not be published until after the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection (c) for the preparation of such Statement, whichever occurs first.
(2) If in the view of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, or the Commission a proposed subsequent arrangement might significantly contribute to proliferation, the Secretary of State, in consultation with such Secretary or the Commission, shall prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with regard to such proposed subsequent arrangement regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the application of the peaceful use assurances of the relevant agreement to ensure that assistance to be furnished pursuant to the subsequent arrangement will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. For the purposes of this section, the term “subsequent arrangements” means arrangements entered into by any agency or department of the United States Government with respect to cooperation with any nation or group of nations (but not purely private or domestic arrangements) involving—
(A) contracts for the furnishing of nuclear materials and equipment;
(B) approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of any source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facility, or nuclear technology;
(C) authorization for the distribution of nuclear materials and equipment pursuant to this chapter which is not subject to the procedures set forth in section 2141(b), section 2155, or section 2139(b) of this title;
(D) arrangements for physical security;
(E) arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements;
(F) arrangements for the application of safeguards with respect to nuclear materials and equipment; or
(G) any other arrangement which the President finds to be important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.
(3) The United States will give timely consideration to all requests for prior approval, when required by this chapter, for the reprocessing of material proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or a production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated fuel elements containing such material, and additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, will attempt to expedite such consideration when the terms and conditions for such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation or in some other international agreement executed by the United States and subject to congressional review procedures comparable to those set forth in section 2153 of this title.
(4) All other statutory requirements under other sections of this chapter for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to this subsection shall continue to apply and any other such requirements for prior approval or conditions for entering such arrangements shall also be satisfied before the arrangement takes effect pursuant to paragraph (1).
(b) Reports to Congressional committees; increase in risk of proliferationWith regard to any special nuclear material exported by the United States or produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported by the United States—
(1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent arrangement for the retransfer of any such material to a third country for reprocessing, for the reprocessing of any such material, or for the subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material, until he has provided the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate with a report containing his reasons for entering into such arrangement and a period of 15 days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title) has elapsed: Provided, however, That if in the view of the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate entry into a subsequent arrangement, such period shall consist of fifteen calendar days;
(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a facility which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to March 10, 1978, or for subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device; and
(3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to March 10, 1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place under conditions comparable to those which in his view, and that of the Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).
(c) Procedures for consideration of requests for subsequent arrangements
(d) Activities not prohibited, precluded, or limited
(e) Jurisdiction of Secretary of Energy
(f) Subsequent arrangements involving direct or indirect commitment of United States for storage or other disposition of foreign spent nuclear fuel in United States
(1) With regard to any subsequent arrangement under subsection (a)(2)(E) (for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements), where such arrangement involves a direct or indirect commitment of the United States for the storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, of any foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States, the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement, unless:
(A)
(i) Such commitment of the United States has been submitted to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title) and has been referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such commitment shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the commitment, any such commitment to be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions; or (ii) if the President has submitted a detailed generic plan for such disposition or storage in the United States to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title), which plan has been referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and has not been disapproved during such sixty-day period by the adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance that Congress does not favor the plan; and the commitment is subject to the terms of an effective plan. Any such plan shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions;
(B) The Secretary of Energy has complied with subsection (a); and
(C) The Secretary of Energy has complied, or in the arrangement will comply with all other statutory requirements of this chapter, under sections 2074 and 2075 of this title and any other applicable sections, and any other requirements of law.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the storage or other disposition in the United States of limited quantities of foreign spent nuclear fuel if the President determines that (A) a commitment under section 2074 or 2075 of this title of the United States for storage or other disposition of such limited quantities in the United States is required by an emergency situation, (B) it is in the national interest to take such immediate action, and (C) he notifies the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation and justification thereof, as soon as possible.
(3) Any plan submitted by the President under paragraph (1) shall include a detailed discussion, with detailed information, and any supporting documentation thereof, relating to policy objectives, technical description, geographic information, cost data and justifications, legal and regulatory considerations, environmental impact information and any related international agreements, arrangements or understandings.
(4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “foreign spent nuclear fuel” shall include any nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the legal ownership or other control of the fuel or reactor and regardless of the origin or licensing of the fuel or reactor, but not including fuel irradiated in a research reactor.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 131, as added Pub. L. 95–242, title III, § 303(a), Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 127; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; amended Pub. L. 103–437, § 15(f)(6), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4592; Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, title XII, § 1225(d)(6), (7), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–774.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160

§ 2160a. Review of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements

No court or regulatory body shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of or to review the adequacy of the performance of any Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, or any annexes thereto, called for in this Act or in the 1954 Act.

(Pub. L. 95–242, title IV, § 406, Mar. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 148; Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, title XII, § 1225(e)(5), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–775.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160a

§ 2160b. Authority to suspend nuclear cooperation with nations which have not ratified the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Material

The President may suspend nuclear cooperation under this chapter with any nation or group of nations which has not ratified the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Material.

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 132, as added Pub. L. 99–399, title VI, § 602, Aug. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 875; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160b

§ 2160c. Consultation with Department of Defense concerning certain exports and subsequent arrangements
(a) In addition to other applicable requirements—
(1) a license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under this chapter for the export of special nuclear material described in subsection (b); and
(2) approval may be granted by the Secretary of Energy under section 2160 of this title for the transfer of special nuclear material described in subsection (b);
only after the Secretary of Defense has been consulted on whether the physical protection of that material during the export or transfer will be adequate to deter theft, sabotage, and other acts of international terrorism which would result in the diversion of that material. If, in the view of the Secretary of Defense based on all available intelligence information, the export or transfer might be subject to a genuine terrorist threat, the Secretary shall provide to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, his written assessment of the risk and a description of the actions the Secretary of Defense considers necessary to upgrade physical protection measures.
(b) Subsection (a) applies to the export or transfer of more than 2 kilograms of plutonium or more than 5 kilograms of uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 or the isotope 235.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 133, as added Pub. L. 99–399, title VI, § 603, Aug. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 875; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 902(a)(8), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; amended Pub. L. 103–236, title VIII, § 829, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 521.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160c

§ 2160d. Further restrictions on exports
(a) In generalExcept as provided in subsection (b), the Commission may issue a license for the export of highly enriched uranium to be used as a fuel or target in a nuclear research or test reactor only if, in addition to any other requirement of this chapter, the Commission determines that—
(1) there is no alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target enriched in the isotope 235 to a lesser percent than the proposed export, that can be used in that reactor;
(2) the proposed recipient of that uranium has provided assurances that, whenever an alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target can be used in that reactor, it will use that alternative in lieu of highly enriched uranium; and
(3) the United States Government is actively developing an alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target that can be used in that reactor.
(b) Medical isotope production
(1) DefinitionsIn this subsection:
(A) Highly enriched uranium
(B) Medical isotope
(C) RadiopharmaceuticalThe term “radiopharmaceutical” means a radioactive isotope that—
(i) contains byproduct material combined with chemical or biological material; and
(ii) is designed to accumulate temporarily in a part of the body for therapeutic purposes or for enabling the production of a useful image for use in a diagnosis of a medical condition.
(D) Recipient country
(2) LicensesThe Commission may issue a license authorizing the export (including shipment to and use at intermediate and ultimate consignees specified in the license) to a recipient country of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production if, in addition to any other requirements of this chapter (except subsection (a)), the Commission determines that—
(A) a recipient country that supplies an assurance letter to the United States Government in connection with the consideration by the Commission of the export license application has informed the United States Government that any intermediate consignees and the ultimate consignee specified in the application are required to use the highly enriched uranium solely to produce medical isotopes; and
(B) the highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production will be irradiated only in a reactor in a recipient country that—
(i) uses an alternative nuclear reactor fuel; or
(ii) is the subject of an agreement with the United States Government to convert to an alternative nuclear reactor fuel when alternative nuclear reactor fuel can be used in the reactor.
(3) Review of physical protection requirements
(A) In general
(B) Imposition of additional requirements
(4) First report to Congress
(A) NAS studyThe Secretary shall enter into an arrangement with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to determine—
(i) the feasibility of procuring supplies of medical isotopes from commercial sources that do not use highly enriched uranium;
(ii) the current and projected demand and availability of medical isotopes in regular current domestic use;
(iii) the progress that is being made by the Department of Energy and others to eliminate all use of highly enriched uranium in reactor fuel, reactor targets, and medical isotope production facilities; and
(iv) the potential cost differential in medical isotope production in the reactors and target processing facilities if the products were derived from production systems that do not involve fuels and targets with highly enriched uranium.
(B) FeasibilityFor the purpose of this subsection, the use of low enriched uranium to produce medical isotopes shall be determined to be feasible if—
(i) low enriched uranium targets have been developed and demonstrated for use in the reactors and target processing facilities that produce significant quantities of medical isotopes to serve United States needs for such isotopes;
(ii) sufficient quantities of medical isotopes are available from low enriched uranium targets and fuel to meet United States domestic needs; and
(iii) the average anticipated total cost increase from production of medical isotopes in such facilities without use of highly enriched uranium is less than 10 percent.
(C) Report by the SecretaryNot later than 5 years after August 8, 2005, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report that—
(i) contains the findings of the National Academy of Sciences made in the study under subparagraph (A); and
(ii) discloses the existence of any commitments from commercial producers to provide domestic requirements for medical isotopes without use of highly enriched uranium consistent with the feasibility criteria described in subparagraph (B) not later than the date that is 4 years after the date of submission of the report.
(5) Second report to Congress
(6) Certification
(7) Sunset provision
(c) Medical production license sunset
(d) Medical production license extensionThe period referred to in subsection (c) may be extended for no more than 6 years if, no earlier than 6 years after January 2, 2013, the Secretary of Energy certifies to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate that—
(1) there is insufficient global supply of molybdenum-99 produced without the use of highly enriched uranium available to satisfy the domestic United States market; and
(2) the export of United States-origin highly enriched uranium for the purposes of medical isotope production is the most effective temporary means to increase the supply of molybdenum-99 to the domestic United States market.
(e) Public notice
(f) Joint certification
(1) In generalIn accordance with paragraph (2), the ban on the export of highly enriched uranium for purposes of medical isotope production referred to in subsections (c) and (d) shall not go into effect unless the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Health and Human Services have jointly certified that—
(A) there is a sufficient supply of molybdenum-99 produced without the use of highly enriched uranium available to meet the needs of patients in the United States; and
(B) it is not necessary to export United States-origin highly enriched uranium for the purposes of medical isotope production in order to meet United States patient needs.
(2) Time of certification
(g) Suspension of medical production licenseAt any time after the restriction of export licenses provided for in subsection (c) becomes effective, if there is a critical shortage in the supply of molybdenum-99 available to satisfy the domestic United States medical isotope needs, the restriction of export licenses may be suspended for a period of no more than 12 months, if—
(1) the Secretary of Energy certifies to the Congress that the export of United States-origin highly enriched uranium for the purposes of medical isotope production is the only effective temporary means to increase the supply of molybdenum-99 necessary to meet United States medical isotope needs during that period; and
(2) the Congress enacts a Joint Resolution approving the temporary suspension of the restriction of export licenses.
(h) DefinitionsAs used in this section—
(1) the term “alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target” means a nuclear reactor fuel or target which is enriched to less than 20 percent in the isotope U–235;
(2) the term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U–235;
(3) a fuel or target “can be used” in a nuclear research or test reactor if—
(A) the fuel or target has been qualified by the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program of the Department of Energy; and
(B) use of the fuel or target will permit the large majority of ongoing and planned experiments and medical isotope production to be conducted in the reactor without a large percentage increase in the total cost of operating the reactor; and
(4) the term “medical isotope” includes molybdenum-99, iodine-131, xenon-133, and other radioactive materials used to produce a radiopharmaceutical for diagnostic or therapeutic procedures or for research and development.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 134, as added Pub. L. 102–486, title IX, § 903(a)(1), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2944; Pub. L. 109–58, title VI, § 630, Aug. 8, 2005, 119 Stat. 785; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3174, Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2214.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160d

§ 2160e. Congressional review and oversight of agreements with Iran
(a) Transmission to Congress of nuclear agreements with Iran and verification assessment with respect to such agreements
(1) Transmission of agreementsNot later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—
(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;
(B) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the agreement; and
(C) a certification that—
(i) the agreement includes the appropriate terms, conditions, and duration of the agreement’s requirements with respect to Iran’s nuclear activities and provisions describing any sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by the United States, and any other nation or entity, including the United Nations; and
(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose.
(2) Verification assessment report
(A) In generalThe Secretary of State shall prepare, with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a report assessing—
(i) the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and commitments under the agreement;
(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program to ensure Iran’s activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose; and
(iii) the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement, including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether it has the required funding, manpower, and authority to undertake the verification regime required by or related to the agreement.
(B) AssumptionsIn preparing a report under subparagraph (A) with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assume that Iran could—
(i) use all measures not expressly prohibited by the agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations and commitments under the agreement; and
(ii) alter or deviate from standard practices in order to impede efforts to verify that Iran is complying with those obligations and commitments.
(C) Classified annex
(3) Exception
(A) In general
(B) Additional requirement
(b) Period for review by Congress of nuclear agreements with Iran
(1) In general
(2) Exception
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional review period
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval
(6) ExceptionThe prohibitions under paragraphs (3) through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension is made—
(A) consistent with the law in effect on May 22, 2015; and
(B) not later than 45 calendar days before the transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment report, and certification under subsection (a).
(7) Definition
(c) Effect of congressional action with respect to nuclear agreements with Iran
(1) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;
(B) these negotiations are a critically important matter of national security and foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;
(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;
(D) this section provides for congressional review, including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and
(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
(2) In generalNotwithstanding any other provision of law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action—
(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor the agreement;
(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the agreement; or
(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, following the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any such joint resolution.
(3) Definition
(d) Congressional oversight of Iranian compliance with nuclear agreements
(1) In general
(2) Potentially significant breaches and compliance incidents
(3) Material breach report
(4) Semi-annual reportNot later than 180 calendar days after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a), and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran’s nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement during the period covered by the report, including the following elements:
(A) Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement.
(B) Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in Iran as required by the agreement.
(C) Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the International Atomic Energy Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
(D) Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance Iran’s ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
(E) Any centrifuge research and development conducted by Iran that—
(i) is not in compliance with the agreement; or
(ii) may substantially reduce the breakout time of acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.
(F) Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in Iran’s nuclear program in violation of the agreement.
(G) Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran, including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert fissile material activities or research and development.
(H) An assessment of whether any Iranian financial institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist finance activities, including names of specific financial institutions if applicable.
(I) Iran’s advances in its ballistic missile program, including developments related to its long-range and inter-continental ballistic missile programs.
(J) An assessment of—
(i) whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;
(ii) whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;
(iii) all actions, including in international fora, being taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism against the United States and United States persons;
(iv) the impact on the national security of the United States and the safety of United States citizens as a result of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and
(v) all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran, pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or deferred and Iran’s nuclear weapon’s program.
(K) An assessment of whether violations of internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed, increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day period.
(5) Additional reports and information
(A) Agency reports
(B) Provision of information on nuclear initiatives with Iran
(6) Compliance certificationAfter the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—
(A) determine whether the President is able to certify that—
(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;
(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and
(iv) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and(II) vital to the national security interests of the United States; and
(B) if the President determines he is able to make the certification described in subparagraph (A), make such certification to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.
(7) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—
(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);
(B) issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and the national security of the United States, and should be expeditiously addressed;
(C) the President should determine the agreement in no way compromises the commitment of the United States to Israel’s security, nor its support for Israel’s right to exist; and
(D) in order to responsibly implement any long-term agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
(e) Expedited consideration of legislation
(1) Initiation
(A) In general
(B) Definition
(2) Qualifying legislation definedFor purposes of this subsection, the term “qualifying legislation” means only a bill of either House of Congress—
(A) the title of which is as follows: “A bill reinstating statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran.”; and
(B) the matter after the enacting clause of which is: “Any statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran pursuant to ______ that were waived, suspended, reduced, or otherwise relieved pursuant to an agreement submitted pursuant to section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are hereby reinstated and any action by the United States Government to facilitate the release of funds or assets to Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any further waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to such agreement is hereby prohibited.”, with the blank space being filled in with the law or laws under which sanctions are to be reinstated.
(3) IntroductionDuring the 60-calendar day period provided for in paragraph (1), qualifying legislation may be introduced—
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).
(4) Floor consideration in House of Representatives
(A) Reporting and discharge
(B) Proceeding to consideration
(C) Consideration
(5) Consideration in the Senate
(A) Committee referral
(B) Reporting and discharge
(C) Proceeding to consideration
(D) Debate
(E) Vote on passage
(F) Rulings of the Chair on procedure
(G) Consideration of veto messages
(6) Rules relating to Senate and House of Representatives
(A) Coordination with action by other HouseIf, before the passage by one House of qualifying legislation of that House, that House receives qualifying legislation from the other House, then the following procedures shall apply:
(i) The qualifying legislation of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.
(ii) With respect to qualifying legislation of the House receiving the legislation—(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no qualifying legislation had been received from the other House; but(II) the vote on passage shall be on the qualifying legislation of the other House.
(B) Treatment of a bill of other House
(C) Treatment of companion measures
(D) Application to revenue measures
(f) Rules of House of Representatives and SenateSubsection (e) is enacted by Congress—
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of legislation described in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(g) Rules of constructionNothing in the section shall be construed as—
(1) modifying, or having any other impact on, the President’s authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by this section;
(2) allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law, or allowing the President to refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) during the period for review provided in subsection (b);
(3) revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions imposed on Iran; or
(4) authorizing the use of military force against Iran.
(h) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) Agreement
(2) Appropriate congressional committees
(3) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership
(4) Iranian financial institution
(5) Joint Plan of Action
(6) EU-Iran Joint Statement
(7) Material breachThe term “material breach” means, with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), any breach of the agreement, or in the case of non-binding commitments, any failure to perform those commitments, that substantially—
(A) benefits Iran’s nuclear program;
(B) decreases the amount of time required by Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon; or
(C) deviates from or undermines the purposes of such agreement.
(8) Noncompliance defined
(9) P5+1 countries
(10) United States person
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 135, as added Pub. L. 114–17, § 2, May 22, 2015, 129 Stat. 201.)

CITE AS: 42 USC 2160e