22 USC 9226 - Travel sanctions

Collapse to view only § 9226. Travel sanctions

§ 9221. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern
§ 9221a. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts
§ 9221b. Sanctions with respect to foreign financial institutions that provide financial services to certain sanctioned persons
§ 9221c. Prohibition on transactions with certain sanctioned persons by persons owned or controlled by United States financial institutions
§ 9222. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions on North Korea
§ 9223. Proliferation prevention sanctions
§ 9224. Procurement sanctions
§ 9225. Enhanced inspection authorities
§ 9226. Travel sanctions
§ 9227. Travel recommendations for United States citizens to North Korea
§ 9228. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation
§ 9229. Report on and imposition of sanctions to address persons responsible for knowingly engaging in significant activities undermining cybersecurity
§ 9230. Codification of sanctions with respect to North Korean activities undermining cybersecurity
§ 9231. Sense of Congress on trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan

§ 9221. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern

(a) FindingsCongress makes the following findings:

(1) The Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who is responsible for safeguarding the financial system against illicit use, money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has repeatedly expressed concern about North Korea’s misuse of the international financial system—

(A) in 2006—

(i) stated, “Given [North Korea’s] counterfeiting of U.S. currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts world-wide to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly invisible.”; and

(ii) urged financial institutions worldwide to “think carefully about the risks of doing any North Korea-related business”;

(B) in 2011, stated that North Korea—

(i) “remains intent on engaging in proliferation, selling arms as well as bringing in material”; and

(ii) was “aggressively pursuing the effort to establish front companies.”; and

(i) in reference to North Korea’s distribution of high-quality counterfeit United States currency, that “North Korea is continuing to try to pass a supernote into the international financial system”; and

(ii) the Department of the Treasury would soon introduce new currency with improved security features to protect against counterfeiting by the Government of North Korea.

(2) The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body whose purpose is to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, has repeatedly—

(A) expressed concern at deficiencies in North Korea’s regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;

(B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of action to address significant deficiencies in those regimes and the serious threat those deficiencies pose to the integrity of the international financial system;

(C) urged all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks emanating from North Korea;

(D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with North Korea, including North Korean companies and financial institutions; and

(E) called on all jurisdictions—

(i) to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade countermeasures and risk mitigation practices; and

(ii) to take into account money laundering and terrorist financing risks when considering requests by North Korean financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their respective jurisdictions.

(3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, which—

(A) welcomed the Financial Action Task Force’s—

(i) recommendation on financial sanctions related to proliferation; and

(ii) guidance on the implementation of such sanctions;

(B) decided that United Nations member states should apply enhanced monitoring and other legal measures to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of property that could contribute to activities prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

(C) called upon United Nations member states to prohibit North Korean financial institutions from establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with financial institutions in their respective jurisdictions to prevent the provision of financial services if such member states have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such activities could contribute to—

(i) activities prohibited by an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution; or

(ii) the evasion of such prohibitions.

(b) Sense of Congress regarding the designation of North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concernCongress—

(1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to impose limitations on, and to require the enhanced monitoring of, transactions involving North Korean financial institutions that could contribute to sanctioned activities;

(2) urges the President, in the strongest terms—

(A) to immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and

(B) to adopt stringent special measures to safeguard the financial system against the risks posed by North Korea’s willful evasion of sanctions and its illicit activities; and

(3) urges the President to seek the prompt implementation by other countries of enhanced monitoring and due diligence to prevent North Korea’s misuse of the international financial system, including by sharing information about activities, transactions, and property that could contribute to—

(A) activities sanctioned by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; or

(B) the evasion of such sanctions.

(1) In general

(2) Enhanced due diligence and reporting requirements

(3) Report required

(A) In general

(B) Form

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 201, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 101.)

§ 9221a. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts

(a) In general

(b) Exception

A United States financial institution is authorized to process transfers of funds to or from North Korea, or for the direct or indirect benefit of any person, foreign government, or financial institution that is designated under section 9214 of this title, only if the transfer—

(1) arises from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been authorized by a specific or general license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury; and

(2) does not involve debiting or crediting a North Korean account.

In this section:

(1) Correspondent account

(2) United States financial institution

(3) Foreign financial institution

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 201A, as added Pub. L. 115–44, title III, § 312(a), Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 945.)

§ 9221b. Sanctions with respect to foreign financial institutions that provide financial services to certain sanctioned persons

(a) In general

The Secretary of the Treasury shall impose one or more of the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign financial institution that the Secretary determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, knowingly, on or after the date that is 120 days after December 20, 2019, provides significant financial services to any person designated for the imposition of sanctions with respect to North Korea under—

(1) subsection (a), (b), or (g) of section 9214 of this title;

(2) an applicable Executive order; or

(3) an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution.

(b) Sanctions described

The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign financial institution subject to subsection (a) are the following:

(1) Asset blocking

(2) Restrictions on correspondent and payable-through accounts

(1) Implementation

(2) Penalties

(d) Regulations

(e) Exception relating to importation of goods

(1) In general

(2) Good defined

(f) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through account

(2) Foreign financial institution

(3) Knowingly

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 201B, as added Pub. L. 116–92, div. F, title LXXI, § 7121(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2245.)

§ 9221c. Prohibition on transactions with certain sanctioned persons by persons owned or controlled by United States financial institutions

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prohibit an entity owned or controlled by a United States financial institution and established or maintained outside the United States from knowingly engaging in any transaction described in subsection (b) directly or indirectly with the Government of North Korea or any person designated for the imposition of sanctions with respect to North Korea under—

(1) subsection (a), (b), or (g) of section 9214 of this title;

(2) an applicable Executive order; or

(3) an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution.

(b) Transactions described

(d) United States financial institution defined

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 201C, as added Pub. L. 116–92, div. F, title LXXI, § 7121(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2246.)

§ 9222. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions on North Korea

(a) FindingsCongress makes the following findings:

(1) All member states of the United Nations are obligated to implement and enforce applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions fully and promptly, including by blocking the property of, and ensuring that any property is prevented from being made available to, persons designated for the blocking of property by the Security Council under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(2) As of May 2015, 158 of the 193 member states of the United Nations had not submitted reports on measures taken to implement North Korea-specific United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094.

(3) A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO–15–485)—

(A) finds that officials of the United States and representatives of the United Nations Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), which monitors and facilitates implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea, “agree that the lack of detailed reports from all member states is an impediment to the UN’s effective implementation of its sanctions”; and

(B) notes that “many member states lack the technical capacity to enforce sanctions and prepare reports” on the implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.

(4) All member states share a common interest in protecting the international financial system from the risks of money laundering and illicit transactions emanating from North Korea.

(5) The United States dollar and the euro are the world’s principal reserve currencies, and the United States and the European Union are primarily responsible for the protection of the international financial system from the risks described in paragraph (4).

(6) The cooperation of the People’s Republic of China, as North Korea’s principal trading partner, is essential to—

(A) the enforcement of applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

(B) the protection of the international financial system.

(7) The report of the Panel of Experts expressed concern about the ability of banks to detect and prevent illicit transfers involving North Korea if such banks are located in member states with less effective regulators or member states that are unable to afford effective compliance.

(8) North Korea has historically exploited inconsistencies between jurisdictions in the interpretation and enforcement of financial regulations and applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to circumvent sanctions and launder the proceeds of illicit activities.

(9) Amroggang Development Bank, Bank of East Land, and Tanchon Commercial Bank have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union as having materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(10) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury and the European Union as having materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(11) The Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for facilitating transactions on behalf of persons linked to its proliferation network and for serving as “a key financial node”.

(12) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for activities prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, including the use of deceptive financial practices to facilitate transactions on behalf of persons linked to North Korea’s proliferation network.

(b) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that the President should intensify diplomatic efforts in appropriate international fora, such as the United Nations, and bilaterally, to develop and implement a coordinated, consistent, multilateral strategy for protecting the global financial system against risks emanating from North Korea, including—

(1) the cessation of any financial services the continuation of which is inconsistent with applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(2) the cessation of any financial services to persons, including financial institutions, that present unacceptable risks of facilitating money laundering and illicit activity by the Government of North Korea;

(3) the blocking by all member states, in accordance with the legal process of the state in which the property is held, of any property required to be blocked under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) the blocking of any property derived from illicit activity, or from the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, officials of the Government of North Korea;

(5) the blocking of any property involved in significant activities undermining cybersecurity by the Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly, against United States persons, or the theft of intellectual property by the Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly from United States persons; and

(6) the blocking of any property of persons directly or indirectly involved in censorship or human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea.

(c) Strategy to improve international implementation and enforcement of United Nations North Korea-specific sanctionsThe President shall direct the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop a strategy to improve international implementation and enforcement of United Nations North Korea-specific sanctions. The strategy should include elements—

(1) to increase the number of countries submitting reports to the United Nations Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), including developing a list of targeted countries where effective implementation and enforcement of United Nations sanctions would reduce the threat from North Korea;

(2) to encourage member states of the United Nations to cooperate and share information with the panel in order to help facilitate investigations;

(3) to expand cooperation with the Panel of Experts;

(4) to provide technical assistance to member states to implement United Nations sanctions, including developing the capacity to enforce sanctions through improved export control regulations, border security, and customs systems;

(5) to harness existing United States Government initiatives and assistance programs, as appropriate, to improve sanctions implementation and enforcement; and

(6) to increase outreach to the people of North Korea, and to support the engagement of independent, non-governmental journalistic, humanitarian, and other institutions in North Korea.

(d) Report required

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 202, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 104.)

§ 9223. Proliferation prevention sanctions

(a) Export of certain goods or technology

(b) Transactions in defense articles or defense services

(1) In general

(2) Applicability

(c) WaiverNotwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State may waive the prohibitions under this section with respect to a country if the Secretary—

(1) determines that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and

(2) submits a written report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes—

(A) the steps that the relevant agencies are taking to curtail the trade described in subsection (b)(1); and

(B) why such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(d) Exception

(e) Report on arms trafficking involving North Korea

(1) In general

(2) Form

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 203, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 106; Pub. L. 115–44, title III, § 313, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 945; Pub. L. 116–92, div. F, title LXXI, § 7123, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2248.)

§ 9224. Procurement sanctions

(a) In general

(b) Federal Acquisition Regulation

(1) In general

(2) Applicability

(1) Inclusion on list

(2) Contract termination; suspension

(A) terminate any contract with such person; and

(B) debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts for a period of not longer than 2 years.

(3) Applicable procedures

(d) Clarification regarding certain products

(e) Rule of construction

(f) Executive agency defined

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 204, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 107; Pub. L. 116–92, div. F, title LXXI, § 7122(b)(3), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2248.)

§ 9225. Enhanced inspection authorities

(a) Report required

(1) In generalNot later than 180 days after August 2, 2017, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) identifying the operators of foreign sea ports and airports that knowingly—

(i) significantly fail to implement or enforce regulations to inspect ships, aircraft, cargo, or conveyances in transit to or from North Korea, as required by applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(ii) facilitate the transfer, transshipment, or conveyance of significant types or quantities of cargo, vessels, or aircraft owned or controlled by persons designated under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions; or

(iii) facilitate any of the activities described in section 9214(a) of this title;

(B) describing the extent to which the requirements of applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to de-register any vessel owned, controlled, or operated by or on behalf of the Government of North Korea have been implemented by other foreign countries;

(C) describing the compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the sanctions mandated in applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(D) identifying vessels, aircraft, and conveyances owned or controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea; and

(E) describing the diplomatic and enforcement efforts by the President to secure the full implementation of the applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, as described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(2) Form

(b) Specific findingsEach report required under subsection (a) shall include specific findings with respect to the following ports and airports:

(1) The ports of Dandong, Dalian, and any other port in the People’s Republic of China that the President deems appropriate.

(2) The ports of Abadan, Bandar-e-Abbas, Chabahar, Bandar-e-Khomeini, Bushehr Port, Asaluyeh Port, Kish, Kharg Island, Bandar-e-Lenge, and Khorramshahr, and Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport, in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(3) The ports of Nakhodka, Vanino, and Vladivostok, in the Russian Federation.

(4) The ports of Latakia, Banias, and Tartous, and Damascus International Airport, in the Syrian Arab Republic.

(1) In generalExcept as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Homeland Security may, using a layered approach, require enhanced screening procedures to determine whether physical inspections are warranted of any cargo bound for or landed in the United States that—

(A) has been transported through a sea port or airport the operator of which has been identified by the President in accordance with subsection (a)(1) as having repeatedly failed to comply with applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(B) is aboard a vessel or aircraft, or within a conveyance that has, within the last 365 days, entered the territory or waters of North Korea, or landed in any of the sea ports or airports of North Korea; or

(C) is registered by a country or jurisdiction whose compliance has been identified by the President as deficient pursuant to subsection (a)(2).

(2) Exception for food, medicine, and humanitarian shipments

(d) Seizure and forfeitureA vessel, aircraft, or conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described in section 9214(a) of this title under the jurisdiction of the United States may be seized and forfeited, or subject to forfeiture, under—

(1) chapter 46 of title 18; or

(2) part V of title IV of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1581 et seq.).

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 205, as added Pub. L. 115–44, title III, § 314, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 946.)

§ 9226. Travel sanctions

The Secretary of State may deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deny entry into the United States of, any alien who is—

(1) a designated person;

(2) a corporate officer of a designated person; or

(3) a principal shareholder with a controlling interest in a designated person.

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 206, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 108.)

§ 9227. Travel recommendations for United States citizens to North Korea

The Secretary of State shall expand the scope and frequency of issuance of travel warnings for all United States citizens to North Korea. The expanded travel warnings, which should be issued or updated not less frequently than every 90 days, should include—

(1) publicly released or credible open source information regarding the detention of United States citizens by North Korean authorities, including available information on circumstances of arrest and detention, duration, legal proceedings, and conditions under which a United States citizen has been, or continues to be, detained by North Korean authorities, including present-day cases and cases occurring during the 10-year period ending on February 18, 2016;

(2) publicly released or credible open source information on the past and present detention and abduction or alleged abduction of citizens of the United States, South Korea, or Japan by North Korean authorities;

(3) unclassified information about the nature of the North Korean regime, as described in congressionally mandated reports and annual reports issued by the Department of State and the United Nations, including information about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs, illicit activities, international sanctions violations, and human rights situation; and

(4) any other information that the Secretary deems useful to provide United States citizens with a comprehensive picture of the nature of the North Korean regime.

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 207, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 108.)

§ 9228. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation

(a) Exemptions

The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under sections 9214, 9221a, 9221b, 9221c, 9226, 9229, 9241a, 9241b, and 9243 of this title:

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other international agreements.

(3) Any activities incidental to the POW/MIA accounting mission in North Korea, including activities by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency and other governmental or nongovernmental organizations tasked with identifying or recovering the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces in North Korea.

(b) Humanitarian waiver

(1) In general

(2) Content of written determination

(3) Clarification of permitted activities under waiver

An internationally recognized humanitarian organization shall not be subject to sanctions under section 9214, 9221a, 9221b, 9221c, 9224, 9225, 9226, 9229(b), 9241a, 9241b, or 9243(b) of this title for—

(A) engaging in a financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes pursuant to a waiver issued under paragraph (1);

(B) transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a waiver; or

(C) having merely incidental contact, in the course of providing humanitarian assistance or aid for humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a waiver, with individuals who are under the control of a foreign person subject to sanctions under this chapter.

The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, for renewable periods of between 30 days and 1 year, the application of the sanctions authorized under section 9214, 9221a, 9221b, 9221c, 9221(c)(2), 9224, 9225, 9226, 9229(b), 9241a, 9241b, or 9243(b) of this title if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination that the waiver—

(1) is important to the national security interests of the United States; or

(2) will further the enforcement of this chapter or is for an important law enforcement purpose.

(d) Financial services for humanitarian and consular activities

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 208, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 109; Pub. L. 115–44, title III, § 322, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 953; Pub. L. 116–92, div. F, title LXXI, § 7143(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2255.)

§ 9229. Report on and imposition of sanctions to address persons responsible for knowingly engaging in significant activities undermining cybersecurity

(a) Report required

(1) In general

(2) Information

The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) the identity and nationality of persons that have knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided material support to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity described in paragraph (1);

(B) a description of the conduct engaged in by each person identified;

(C) an assessment of the extent to which a foreign government has provided material support to the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that Government to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity; and

(D) a United States strategy to counter North Korea’s efforts to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity against the United States, that includes efforts to engage foreign governments to halt the capability of the Government of North Korea and persons acting for or on behalf of that Government to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity.

(3) Submission and form

(A) Submission

(B) Form

(b) Designation of persons

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 209, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 110; Pub. L. 115–272, title III, § 303(c)(1), Oct. 25, 2018, 132 Stat. 4157.)

§ 9230. Codification of sanctions with respect to North Korean activities undermining cybersecurity

(a) In general

(b) Rule of construction

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 210, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 111.)

§ 9231. Sense of Congress on trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan

(a) In general

It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(1) should seek to strengthen high-level trilateral mechanisms for discussion and coordination of policy toward North Korea between the Government of the United States, the Government of South Korea, and the Government of Japan;

(2) should ensure that the mechanisms specifically address North Korea’s nuclear, ballistic, and conventional weapons programs, its human rights record, and cybersecurity threats posed by North Korea;

(3) should ensure that representatives of the United States, South Korea, and Japan meet on a regular basis and include representatives of the United States Department of State, the United States Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and representatives of counterpart agencies in South Korea and Japan; and

(4) should continue to brief the relevant congressional committees regularly on the status of such discussions.

(b) Relevant committees

The relevant committees referred to in subsection (a)(4) shall include—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 114–122, title II, § 211, Feb. 18, 2016, 130 Stat. 111.)