- § 8151. Notification to Congress of IAEA Board approval of wide-area environmental sampling
- § 8152. Application of national security exclusion to wide-area environmental sampling
- § 8153. Application of national security exclusion to location-specific environmental sampling
- § 8154. Rule of construction
§ 8151. Notification to Congress of IAEA Board approval of wide-area environmental sampling
(a) In general
(b) Content
The notification under subsection (a) shall contain—
(1) a description of the specific methods and sampling techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and
(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title II, § 251, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2749.)
§ 8152. Application of national security exclusion to wide-area environmental samplingIn accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling that—
the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or information of direct national security significance; and
(3) the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested complementary access involving wide-area environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the United States that involves the use of wide-area environmental sampling.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title II, § 252, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2750.)
§ 8153. Application of national security exclusion to location-specific environmental samplingIn accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling that—
(1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or information of direct national security significance; and
(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental sampling, the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested complementary access involving location-specific environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the United States that involves the use of location-specific environmental sampling.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title II, § 253, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2750.)
§ 8154. Rule of construction
As used in this subchapter, the term “necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party” shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by—
(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of such sampling; or
(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or political support for such sampling in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title II, § 254, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2751.)