Collapse to view only § 8002. Statements of policy
- § 8001. Sense of Congress
- § 8002. Statements of policy
- § 8003. Waiver authority and congressional approval
- § 8004. United States compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations
- § 8005. Inoperability of determination and waivers
- § 8006. MTCR adherent status
- § 8007. United States-India scientific cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program
- § 8008. Definitions
§ 8001. Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign policy;
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they develop;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT if—
(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to nonproliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and implement substantially improved protections against the proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national interest of the United States;
(9) the United States and India share common democratic values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement;
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all countries;
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime;
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes India’s adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under United States law.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 102, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2726.)
§ 8002. Statements of policy
(a) In generalThe following shall be the policies of the United States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT.
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards obligations.
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those 1
1 So in original.
guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG decisionmaking.(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this chapter, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.
(b) With respect to South AsiaThe following shall be the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become parties.
(3) Secure India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160(f)).
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph (2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section [42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1), (3)–(9)].
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 103, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2727.)
§ 8003. Waiver authority and congressional approval
(a) In generalIf the President makes the determination described in subsection (b), the President may—
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 from the requirement of subsection (a)(2) of such section;
(2) waive the application of section 2157 of title 42 with respect to exports to India; and
(3) waive with respect to India the application of—
(A)section 2158(a)(1)(D) of title 42; and
(B)section 2158 of title 42 regarding any actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
(b) Determination by the PresidentThe determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following actions have occurred:
(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.
(2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including materials used in or produced through the use of India’s civil nuclear facilities.
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear program.
(4) India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
(5) India is working with and supporting United States and international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, including through—
(A) the enactment and effective enforcement of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations;
(B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the guidelines and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
(c) Submission to Congress
(1) In general
(2) Information to be includedTo the fullest extent available to the United States, the report referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the following information:
(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate India’s civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.
(B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India’s civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and a description of the progress toward its full implementation.
(C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such Additional Protocol.
(D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.
(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, as well as the support that India is providing to the United States to further United States objectives to restrict the spread of such technology.
(F) A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
(G) A description and assessment of the specific measures that India has taken to fully and actively participate in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
(H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.
(I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by the United States and India that will be implemented under the agreement for nuclear cooperation, including whether such cooperation will include the provision of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
(J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with India will not in any way assist India’s nuclear weapons program.
(d) Restrictions on nuclear transfers
(1) In general
(2) NSG transfer guidelines
(3) Termination of nuclear transfers to India
(A) In generalNotwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 and pursuant to this chapter, and except as provided under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian person of—
(i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or decisions, or
(ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,
unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
(B) ExceptionThe President may choose not to terminate exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology to India under subparagraph (A) if—
(i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph was made without the knowledge of the Government of India;
(ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the Indian person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted without the knowledge of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 8008(5) of this title; and
(iii) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian person with respect to such transfer.
(4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to India related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production
(A) In general
(i) Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(ii) Secretary of Energy
(B) Requirements for approvalsExports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers referred to in subparagraph (A) may only be approved if—
(i) the end user—(I) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities; or(II) is a facility participating in, and the export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer is associated with, a bilateral or multinational program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;
(ii) appropriate measures are in place at any facility referred to in clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in section 3203(5) of this title, will be diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or program not under IAEA safeguards; and
(iii) the President determines that the export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or the production of fissile material for military purposes.
(5) Nuclear export accountability program
(A) In generalThe President shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India so as to ensure—
(i) full implementation of the protections required under section 2153(a)(1) of title 42; and
(ii) United States compliance with Article I of the NPT.
(B) MeasuresThe measures taken pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy, including, as appropriate, conditions regarding end-use monitoring.
(ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 2077(b) of title 42. Such system shall be capable of providing assurances that—(I) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are authorized to receive the nuclear technology;(II) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and will not be used for any military or nuclear explosive purpose; and(III) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United States, and facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use of transferred technology will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United States.
(iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42, appropriate assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are consistent with the requirements of section 2153(a)(1) of title 42 regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason.
(C) Implementation
(e) Omitted
(f) Sunset
(g) Reporting to Congress
(1) Information on nuclear activities of IndiaThe President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India, including—
(A) any material noncompliance on the part of the Government of India with—
(i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
(ii) the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on May 11, 2006;
(iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA;
(iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India and the IAEA;
(v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government of India and the United States Government arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 or any subsequent arrangement under section 2160 of title 42;
(vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, or technology; and
(vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such licenses;
(B) any material inconsistencies between the span or timeliness of notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;
(C) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after December 18, 2006;
(D) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced; and
(E) changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
(2) Implementation and compliance reportNot later than 180 days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including—
(A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
(B) a comprehensive listing of—
(i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations;
(ii) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for the export or reexport to India of commodities, related technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulation,1
1 So in original. Probably should be “Regulations,”.
or any successor regulation;(iii) any other United States authorizations for the export or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and
(iv) with respect to each such license or other form of authorization described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)—(I) the number or other identifying information of each license or authorization;(II) the name or names of the authorized end user or end users;(III) the name of the site, facility, or location in India to which the export or reexport was made;(IV) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and authorizations;(V) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be applied to such exports or reexports; and(VI) the term of validity of each such license or authorization;
(C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries, including any such trade that—
(i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the NSG; or
(ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of United States origin;
(D) either—
(i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in the agreements and other documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph (1)(A); or
(ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance issues arising with regard to the adherence by India to its commitments and obligations, including—(I) the measures the United States Government has taken to remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;(II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures;(III) the measures the United States Government plans to take to this end in the coming year; and(IV) an assessment of the implications of any continued noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India remains in the national security interest of the United States;
(E)
(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in this regard; and
(ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively participating in such efforts, a description of—(I) the measures the United States Government has taken to secure India’s full and active participation in such efforts;(II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures; and(III) the measures the United States Government plans to take in the coming year to secure India’s full and active participation;
(F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear cooperation with India is in any way assisting India’s nuclear weapons program, including through—
(i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United States technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased production by India of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
(G) a detailed description of—
(i) United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
(ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and
(iii) assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the objectives in clause (i), consistent with its obligations under international law and existing agreements;
(H) an estimate of—
(i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year;
(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; and
(iii) the rate of production in India of—(I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and(II) nuclear explosive devices;
(I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India’s nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the previous year and the proportion of such production that can be attributed to India’s declared civil reactors;
(J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
(K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made toward the achievement of India’s—
(i) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;
(ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
(iii) public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(iv) effective implementation of the decision described in clause (iii);
(L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel; and
(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the “Agreement”) approved under section 101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act—
(i) a listing of—(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and other such information as may be so designated by the United States or India under Article 1(Q); and(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Agreement;
(ii) a description of—(I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for by-product material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 1(A) of the Agreement;(II) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the Agreement;(III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;(IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the receiving country of each such transfer;
(iii) an analysis of—(I) any instances in which the United States or India requested consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations; and(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by the end of the reporting period; and
(iv) a statement as to whether—(I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and(II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.
(3) Submittal with other annual reports
(A) Report on proliferation prevention
(B) Report on progress toward regional nonproliferation
(4) Form
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 104, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2729; Pub. L. 110–369, title I, §§ 101(c), 105, Oct. 8, 2008, 122 Stat. 4029, 4030.)
§ 8004. United States compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations
Nothing in this chapter constitutes authority for any action in violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 105, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2738.)
§ 8005. Inoperability of determination and waivers
A determination and any waiver under section 8003 of this title shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after December 18, 2006.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 106, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2738.)
§ 8006. MTCR adherent status
Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes of section 2797b of this title.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 107, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2738.)
§ 8007. United States-India scientific cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program
(a) Establishment
(b) Consultation
(c) National Academies recommendations
(1) In general
(2) Recommendations
The agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of—
(A) recommendations for research and related programs designed to overcome existing technological barriers to nuclear nonproliferation; and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded under this section are achieving the goals of the activities and programs.
(3) Public availability
(d) Consistency with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(e) Authorization of appropriations
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 109, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2739.)
§ 8008. DefinitionsIn this chapter:
(1) The term “Additional Protocol” means a protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
(2) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.
(3) The term “dual-use material, equipment, or technology” means material, equipment, or technology that may be used in nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
(4) The term “IAEA safeguards” has the meaning given the term in section 6305(3) of this title.
(5) The term “Indian person” means—
(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of India or has its principal place of business in India; and
(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
(6) The terms “Missile Technology Control Regime”, “MTCR”, and “MTCR adherent” have the meanings given the terms in section 2797c of this title.
(7) The term “nuclear materials and equipment” means source material, special nuclear material, production and utilization facilities and any components thereof, and any other items or materials that are determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 1
1 So in original. Probably should be “section”.
2139(b) of title 42.(8) The terms “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” and “NPT” mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(9) The terms “Nuclear Suppliers Group” and “NSG” refer to a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least annually since 1992, of Participating Governments that have promulgated and agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
(10) The terms “nuclear weapon” and “nuclear explosive device” mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(11) The term “process” includes the term “reprocess”.
(12) The terms “reprocessing” and “reprocess” refer to the separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products from spent nuclear fuel.
(13) The term “sensitive nuclear technology” means any information, including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof, that is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water.
(14) The term “source material” has the meaning given the term in section 2014(z) of title 42.
(15) The term “special nuclear material” has the meaning given the term in section 2014(aa) of title 42.
(16) The term “unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity” means research on, or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of—
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material, or separate storage installation with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or installation that contains source or special fissionable material; or
(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.
(Pub. L. 109–401, title I, § 110, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2739.)